tisdag 18 juni 2024

The criticism of the agreement is only phantom pain

 

Security Policy
Phantom pains behind opposition to defense deals with the US

Wolfgang Hansson

This is a commenting text. Analysis and positions are the writer's.

Published 22.17 
Hemvärnssoldater och amerikanska operatörer planerar ett uppdrag under övningar på Gotland 2020.
Home Guard soldiers and US operators plan a mission during exercises on Gotland 2020. Photo: Patrik Orcutt / US Army
I interpret the loud discussion about allowing American troops on Swedish soil as a rash of phantom pains on the part of those who find it difficult to accept that Sweden has completely changed its security policy in record time.

In fact, it is about Sweden getting help quickly if we are attacked.
 
Quick version
But many will probably object, we have protection according to paragraph five which means that other countries have to come to our defense if we are attacked.

Unfortunately, paragraph five is rather imprecise. Each country can decide for itself how it wants to assist
Sweden if we request help. It may also take time before all countries have made their decisions and foreign forces are in place.

The so-called DCA agreement with the USA means that weapons, ammunition and other things needed to defend our territory are already in place in Sweden. In a threatening situation, the United States can, at Sweden's request, send soldiers who are ready to face a Russian threat.

In a short time, Sweden has made a difficult and painful journey. We have abandoned our military freedom of alliance, which has been a cornerstone of Swedish security policy, to join NATO instead. It is no wonder that there are phantom pains in those who find it difficult to get used to this brutal 180-degree turn.

I fully understand people who do not want to see American soldiers on Swedish soil. But then we should not have joined NATO at all.

It is important to remember that the very reason why we are now a NATO member is that we want help from allies if Russia chooses to attack Sweden. Such an attack is certainly unlikely, but a little less so today than before Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.

If Sweden has decided that we need help from other countries, it is quite logical that we do what is necessary to make it easier for us to get it if it is really needed. The purpose of the DCA agreement is to ensure that the lead time between a
Russia attack and us being able to get help from outside will be as short as possible. A paragraph 5 raised to 2.0.

It is not the United States that forces the agreement on us. Sweden wants it.

There are no free lunches. This applies not least in security policy. We cannot ask for help from others without it costing something. In this case, that we have agreed to some of the USA's demands, such as that American soldiers who are in Sweden and commit crimes should primarily be tried according to American legislation. It's not the same as them being able to do whatever they want without risking punishment.

The agreement is not unique to Sweden. The US has similar agreements with a number of countries including Norway and Denmark which, as far as I can judge, are still sovereign states.

Finland will soon adopt a similar agreement, without it sparking the same debate as in Sweden.

That being said, the US is not entering into the agreement to be nice. For the superpower, this type of agreement is a way to project power and influence. Show that the US, despite its weakening, can still act worldwide.

The Swedish government has chosen, in contrast to Norway and Denmark, not to request a special clause prohibiting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory during peacetime.

Sweden could very well have requested a similar exception but, like Finland, has chosen not to do so. Perhaps as a result of showing how cooperative we are.

Sweden tends to oscillate between extremes. First, we are completely against joining NATO. But once we decide to join, we swallow everything with guts and hair and want to be the best in the class.

The government could have requested an explicit ban on placing nuclear weapons in Sweden in peacetime to avoid the betrayal debate that arrived like a letter in the mail (to the extent that there is any mail nowadays) from the left, the environmental party and the peace movement.

However, I am not overly concerned that such a guarantee does not exist. I find it difficult to see that the US would secretly place nuclear weapons in Sweden against the express will of the government. That would be a breach of the agreement.

Prime Minister Kristersson has already stated publicly that this can happen in wartime.

There, too, there is something of a lack of alertness among those who have not familiarized themselves with what NATO membership entails.

Nuclear weapons are the very foundation of NATO's deterrence capability. The central role of nuclear weapons is something Sweden signed up to when we joined NATO.

Thus, there is now a clear contradiction between Sweden's traditional role of advocating nuclear disarmament while at the same time we have made ourselves dependent on the United States' nuclear umbrella to protect our national sovereignty.

It also seriously shakes the Swedish self-image.

But same thing here. It's hard to eat the cake and keep it at the same time.

Are there no risks at all in signing an agreement like this? Of course it does. What happens, for example, if Trump comes to power and if the US develops in a more authoritarian direction. Then the conditions can look very different.

But Sweden can nevertheless terminate the agreement. We are not automatically transformed into servile US puppets.

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