That is why Putin needs the conflict with the West, of Alexei Sachnin

 That is why Putin needs the conflict with the West

The "dynastic logic" explains the attack on Ukraine

Of:

Alexei Sachnin

PUBLISHED: TODAY 05.45

This is a cultural article that is part of Aftonbladet's opinion journalism.

Vladimir Putin.

Vladimir Putin.

Photo: Thibault Camus / AP

CULTURE

The most popular genre in political analysis in today's Russia is the confession "I was wrong". Although almost no one thought it would happen, Putin has attacked Ukraine. Experts from across the political spectrum, from Putin supporters to uncompromising opponents, acknowledge that they have failed. I too was wrong, and now I want to understand why.

The caterpillars of the tanks not only destroy Ukraine and the lives of its inhabitants, but also destroy the worldview of all those who believed and hoped for peace. The Russian president's actions are a gift to war hawks on both sides of the new Iron Curtain; in the end, their alarmist forecasts came true. All the deaths and ruined cities are the most convincing arguments these people can get and therefore it will be even harder to question them. Their powers, influence and budget will grow, which risks escalating future conflicts.

Before February 24, our common sense told us that there would be no war after all. It did not seem to benefit the interests of either the Russian people or the Ukrainian people. Yes, not even the ruling regime in Moscow had reason to go to war. The Ukrainian state posed no threat to Russia.

At the same time, the full-scale attack on Ukraine has led to Russia's international isolation, and to unity between the countries in the West. All over the world, understanding of Russia has been shattered, not least among the Ukrainians who previously wanted to preserve ties between the two countries. This can be seen in the hundreds of film clips that are spread online, where Ukrainians in the Russian-speaking regions curse the Russian soldiers.

What could a hypothetical puppet government in Ukraine lean on? There are not enough Russian soldiers to rule an occupied country with an increasingly hostile population. The financial crash triggered by the war will eventually weigh down the budget of Putin's state. And the social catastrophe in the occupied territories will fuel the most radical kind of resistance, as in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Even if the Russian army succeeds in forcing the rulers of Kyiv to capitulate, profits will be minimal. And any subsequent Ukrainian government will instantly brand this "shameful peace." Finally, every failed war Putin undertakes will lead to a questioning of his past conquests, including Crimea, the Donbass, and perhaps even Chechnya.

Fatigue and dissatisfaction are constantly growing, not only among the middle class, but also in those parts of the population where Putin loyalty has previously been greater, such as workers and pensioners

Before the war, there was a promise of success, if Russian diplomacy had maintained the status quo. The West had ridiculed itself with its alarmist rhetoric. Disagreements within NATO and between the United States and the European Union had only increased. Finally, Putin could have counted on some concessions from the West. Common sense was entirely on the side of peace, even from the point of view of the most cynical realpolitik. But on February 24, the dictator of the Kremlin refused both peace and all its benefits, and common sense.

Even among observers who are considered close to the Russian leadership, there were many who did not believe in a war until recently, and who now explain the course of events by saying that Putin is acting irrationally and has become hostage to his own fullness of power. However, I dare to try the idea that there is a distorted "rationality" also in the irrationality of leadership, but that it goes so far beyond the boundaries of what is customary in today's political landscape that it can be difficult to see. I would like to call this logic the "dynastic" logic.

In the imaginary world of Putin, and his inner circle of military intelligence officials, Ukraine has not been as much a threat to Russia since 2014 as a threat to the Putin regime. And it was not just about the rockets that the United States and other allies have equipped Ukraine with.

The problem for the Kremlin was that the Ukrainian conflict was a threat to plans to retain power after the 2024 election. Despite tightening the thumbscrews, it has not been as easy as many thought to leave power with the current leader. Fatigue and dissatisfaction are constantly growing, not only among the middle class but also in those parts of the population where Putin loyalty has previously been greater, such as workers and pensioners. An even more dangerous threat to the regime is the dissatisfaction of the affluent society that has grown tired of the constant conflict with the West.

It is in this context that Ukraine poses a double threat from the point of view of the Russian generals and adjutants. It is very possible that Putin was afraid that Ukraine, with the support of the West, would try to strike at the pro-Russian separatists in Donbass during an election or a major political crisis. Losing Donbass could hit Putin hard with the support of the military, security agents and the entire "patriotic camp." And to both fight their own citizens in the streets and fight against Ukrainian soldiers in the Donbass can end in defeat.

The second and possibly most important factor that makes Ukraine in its current form perhaps the greatest threat to the leader in Moscow is the division within the ruling class. As long as the conflict with the West continues, the loyalty of the oligarchs and corrupt officials to Putin is threatened. Putin needed a final settlement with the West on Ukraine as a guarantee that his own elite would not disappoint him at a critical moment. Since the West could not give him this, the self-proclaimed tsar decided to go berserk.

In contrast to the patriotic mood following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, repression and terror now reign in Russia

He quickly got the oligarchs to choose by convening the Security Council and forcing them to take responsibility for a war that had de facto already begun. On the first day of the war, virtually all Russian oligarchs were gathered in the Kremlin to force them to swear allegiance to the monarch and burn all bridges with the West. Now these dignitaries are forced to hold each other's backs. Not only their incredible privileges, but also their actual freedom are completely connected with Vladimir Putin.

Despite this, there are obvious divisions. When the war began, many of the upper echelons spoke out against it, including several of Russia's richest oligarchs such as Oleg Deripaska and Mikhail Fridman and, more notably, Putin's press secretary Dmitry Peskov's daughter Liza Peskova, who tweeted against the war. Although it was soon erased, this shows that there is far from agreement among the families of the Russian ruling class. For the Putin dynasty, this is a much bigger threat than massive dissatisfaction from below. And this may turn out to be the traditional mistake monarchs make.

For me personally, the war has meant that I have broken with the Left Front, where I have been one of the leaders for 17 years. Before February 24, I could not imagine such a split. Probably every war in history has divided movements, parties and societies, and so it was this time as well. Unfortunately, most of my former comrades have not been able to stand up to the unjust, criminal, and dirty wars that Putin launched to rule forever. In this situation, I do not judge them, but have, together with some others from the movement, joined the vast majority of the people who do not want this war.

As a solution to domestic and foreign policy problems, the war is neither fair nor popular. In contrast to the patriotic mood following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, repression and terror now reign in Russia. This, together with the inevitable deterioration both socially and politically, will lead to popular anger. Images of destruction from the brother country where a quarter of the Russian population has relatives will make even the most loyal regime supporters who bought the propaganda sober up. And the stories of soldiers' graves, which penetrate all the barriers of censorship and are also passed on through rumors, will give this anger a taste of rage and despair.