Most things point in the wrong direction for Ukraine
Niclas Vent
Reporter
This is a commenting text. Analysis and positions are the writer's.
Updated 14.43 | Published 14.37
Ukraine's shock offensive in the Kursk region has been followed by day after day of bad news.
The long lines clearly point in the wrong direction - and the reason is simple.
Reversing the situation is much more difficult.
It is a time of deep concern in Ukraine.
- After the fall of Avdiivka in February, Russian forces have continued westward. The rate of advancement has increased since the summer. The Russian incursion now threatens Pokrovsk, a strategically important city that straddles important roads and railway lines. At the same time, the pocket closes around the Ukrainian forces in southern Donetsk, and if Pokrovsk falls, it becomes increasingly difficult to support them, which paves the way for further Russian advances.
- Several Ukrainian ministers, including Foreign Minister Kuleba and Defense Minister Kamyshin, have resigned.
- One of the few, much-anticipated F-16s that Ukraine has received has been shot down, killing one of Ukraine's most experienced pilots. President Zelenskyi subsequently fired Air Force Chief Mykola Oleshtyuk, fueling the unconfirmed rumor that the plane was shot down by Ukraine's own air defenses.
- Russia's terror bombings continue, and the results are increasingly
devastating. The biggest airstrike of the war, involving more than 230
robots and attack drones, last week was followed by two more large-scale
attacks, before at least 51 people were killed yesterday in a robot
attack on Poltava.
Meanwhile, Ukraine's invasion of Kursk appears to have failed.
It bears saying, given how tactically adept the offensive appears to have been executed. The Ukrainians have advanced rapidly, taking many prisoners and giving the Russian leadership a public nosebleed.
But Putin didn't take the bait.
The main logical reason for the invasion must have been to relieve pressure in Donetsk, by forcing the Russians to shift resources to the defense of Kursk. It does not seem to have happened to any significant extent.
It was a gamble, and it must not have been wrong. If Ukraine can hold its own, the land taken can be used as a trump card in future negotiations.
If.
Anyone who takes a step back from the daily hail of events still sees the long lines curving in the wrong direction. It is not due to courage, cunning or mistake. The reasons are purely material. Russia has more manpower, equipment and ammunition. Ukraine's soldiers and weapons are still too few, and after the Kursk invasion they have an even longer front to hold.
As long as that situation persists, the war cannot turn.
There are things to do immediately.
The US may authorize Ukraine to use long-range weapons against Russia territory. It could threaten Russian air bases and robotic platforms, and in the short term provide important respite.
But it does not affect the strategic situation as a whole.
The longer the war goes on, the greater the risk that the coalition behind Ukraine will crack.
The US presidential election in just a few months could spell disaster if a winning Donald Trump makes good on his threats, but the recent state elections in Germany's Thuringia and Saxony are also ominous.
The far-right AFD received over 30 percent of the vote in both states, and the left-wing populist Sarah Wagenknecht's BSW received 16 and 12 percent respectively. Both parties are critical of Ukraine support – and their electoral success highlights that a significant proportion of Germans agree.
Next year there are parliamentary elections.
The war was a shock, binding our continent's more pro-Russian populations and countries to the harder line that has great support in northeastern Europe.
But shocks wear off.
Germany's "Zeitenwende" in defense and security policy is already being condemned as a failure, and Germany may in the future cut down its support for Ukraine sharply - even without large crowds of populists taking over the Bundestag.
If Germany's support for Ukraine falls, countries such as Italy, Greece and Bulgaria - where a majority is against increasing contributions - can follow like dominoes.
It is easy, and dangerous, to paint the devil on the wall.
Russia is not without problems, but the closed system means that the cracks are not as obvious from the outside. Empires more powerful than Putin's have suddenly collapsed, without anyone seeing it coming. It could happen again.
But blind hope is not a strategy. In fact, none of the wishful thinking allowed in recent years to fill the obvious holes in the West's approach to war has come to fruition.
There are things to do immediately.
The US may authorize Ukraine to use long-range weapons against Russian territory. It could threaten Russian air bases and robotic platforms, and in the short term provide important respite.
But it does not affect the strategic situation as a whole.
The longer the war goes on, the greater the risk that the coalition behind Ukraine will crack.
The US presidential election in just a few months could spell disaster if a winning Donald Trump makes good on his threats, but the recent state elections in Germany's Thuringia and Saxony are also ominous.
The far-right AFD received over 30 percent of the vote in both states, and the left-wing populist Sarah Wagenknecht's BSW received 16 and 12 percent respectively. Both parties are critical of Ukraine support – and their electoral success highlights that a significant proportion of Germans agree.
Next year there are parliamentary elections.
The war was a shock, binding our continent's more pro-Russian populations and countries to the harder line that has great support in northeastern Europe.
But shocks wear off.
Germany's "Zeitenwende" in defense and security policy is already being condemned as a failure, and Germany may in the future cut down its support for Ukraine sharply - even without large crowds of populists taking over the Bundestag.
If Germany's support for Ukraine falls, countries such as Italy, Greece and Bulgaria - where a majority is against increasing contributions - can follow like dominoes.
It is easy,and dangerous, to paint the devil on the wall.
Russia is not without problems, but the closed system means that the cracks are not as obvious from the outside. Empires more powerful than Putin's have suddenly collapsed, without anyone seeing it coming. It could happen again.
But blind hope is not a strategy. In fact, none of the wishful thinking allowed in recent years to fill the obvious holes in the West's approach to war has come to fruition.
- Russia's economy has not collapsed.
- Export restrictions have not stifled the industry.
- The soldiers have not finished.
- The grenades have not been used up.
- The robots are not on the pour.
- The elite have not staged a coup d'état.
- The people have not revolted.
- Putin did not suddenly die of some bizarre disease.
For many other leaders, this nasty, bloody war had already cost more than it tasted.
But Vladimir Putin is clearly a different breed.
Defeating him will cost more, and there will be no gain without the war-weary public opinion in large parts of Europe being lured on board or run over.
In the end, fronts are moved by money and gadgets, not speeches and verbal solidarity.
A damaged building during the large-scale attack on Poltava.
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